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Reasons	  and	  Perception	  Declan	  Smithies	  	   Forthcoming	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Reasons	  and	  Normativity,	  Edited	  by	  Daniel	  Star,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  This	  chapter	  is	  organized	  around	  four	  central	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  reasons	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception:	  	   (1) The	  ‘Whether?’	  Question:	  Does	  perception	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  	   (2) The	  ‘How?’	  Question:	  How	  does	  perception	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  
	   (3) The	  ‘When?’	  Question:	  When	  does	  perception	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  	   (4) The	  ‘What?’	  Question:	  What	  are	  the	  reasons	  that	  perception	  provides	  us	  with	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  	   The	  ‘Whether?’	  question	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  section	  1.	  I	  argue	  that	  perception	  makes	  it	  reasonable	  (that	  is,	  rational	  or	  justified)	  for	  us	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  by	  providing	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  those	  beliefs.	  This	  argument	  relies	  on	  a	  more	  general	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality	  that	  informs	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  ‘How?’	  question	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  section	  2.	  I	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  perception	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  by	  responding	  to	  three	  challenges:	  the	  skeptical	  challenge,	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  challenge,	  and	  Davidson’s	  challenge.	  The	  ‘When?’	  question	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  section	  3.	  I	  compare	  and	  contrast	  two	  accounts	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  On	  the	  Content	  View,	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  by	  representing	  the	  external	  world.	  On	  the	  Knowledge	  View,	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  by	  providing	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  I	  present	  two	  arguments	  –	  an	  argument	  from	  parity	  and	  an	  argument	  from	  luminosity	  –	  that	  combine	  to	  make	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  the	  Content	  View	  and	  against	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  The	  ‘What?’	  question	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  section	  4.	  I	  discuss	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  that	  appeals	  to	  the	  K	  =	  R	  thesis,	  according	  to	  which	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  all	  and	  only	  the	  facts	  that	  one	  knows.	  I	  defend	  the	  Content	  View	  against	  this	  argument	  by	  proposing	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons.	  I	  close	  in	  section	  5	  by	  drawing	  the	  provisional	  conclusion	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  considerations	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  and	  against	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	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1. The	  ‘Whether?’	  Question	  Does	  perception	  provide	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  Here	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  it	  does:	  	   (1) Perception	  is	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  (2) Perception	  is	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  only	  if	  perception	  makes	  it	  reasonable	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  (3) Perception	  makes	  it	  reasonable	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  only	  if	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  (4) Therefore,	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  	  This	  argument	  relies	  on	  the	  following	  commonsensical	  assumptions.	  First,	  we	  have	  some	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  that	  has	  its	  source	  in	  perception.	  Second,	  only	  reasonable	  beliefs	  can	  be	  knowledge.	  And	  third,	  a	  reasonable	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sufficiently	  good	  reasons.	  Each	  of	  these	  assumptions	  can	  be	  challenged.	  The	  first	  assumption	  is	  challenged	  by	  skeptical	  arguments	  that	  purport	  to	  show	  that	  we	  cannot	  have	  any	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception.	  The	  second	  assumption	  is	  challenged	  by	  some	  reliabilist	  theories	  of	  knowledge	  that	  take	  reliability	  not	  as	  a	  criterion	  for	  rationality,	  but	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  it.	  And	  the	  third	  assumption	  is	  challenged	  by	  those	  who	  deny	  that	  rationality	  requires	  responding	  to	  reasons.1	  In	  philosophy,	  everything	  is	  open	  to	  challenge.	  Even	  so,	  each	  of	  these	  assumptions	  has	  a	  good	  claim	  to	  be	  part	  of	  common	  sense.	  I	  tend	  to	  regard	  these	  commonsense	  assumptions	  as	  more	  credible	  than	  any	  of	  the	  philosophical	  theories	  that	  conflict	  with	  them.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  absolutely	  inviolable,	  but	  merely	  that	  they	  are	  reasonable	  starting	  points	  for	  further	  enquiry.	  They	  have	  a	  default	  status	  that	  can	  be	  overridden.	  The	  third	  assumption	  needs	  special	  comment	  because	  it	  incorporates	  a	  substantive	  view	  about	  the	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality	  that	  informs	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter.	  On	  this	  view,	  perception	  makes	  it	  reasonable	  or	  rational	  for	  us	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  by	  providing	  us	  with	  reasons	  for	  those	  beliefs.	  More	  generally,	  rationality	  in	  belief	  and	  action	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  responding	  appropriately	  to	  reasons.	  I’ll	  begin	  by	  clarifying	  this	  assumption.	  What	  is	  a	  reason?	  In	  a	  much-­‐cited	  passage,	  Timothy	  Scanlon	  writes:	  	   I	  will	  take	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  reason	  as	  primitive.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  something	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  lead	  back	  to	  the	  same	  idea:	  a	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  it.	  “Counts	  in	  favor	  how?”	  one	  might	  ask.	  “By	  providing	  a	  reason	  for	  it”	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  only	  answer.	  (1998:	  17)	  	  Scanlon	  takes	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  reason	  as	  primitive	  –	  not	  just	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  analyzed,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  further	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  informative	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  reasons	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  and	  action.	  But	  I	  think	  we	  can	  say	  more.	  Reasons	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  and	  action	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  having	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Scanlon	  (1998:	  Ch.	  1),	  Parfit	  (2011:	  Ch.	  1),	  and	  Broome	  (2013:	  Ch.	  5).	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those	  reasons	  contributes	  towards	  making	  those	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  reasonable	  or	  rational.	  This	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘reason’	  that	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  word	  ‘reason’	  seems	  to	  be	  context-­‐sensitive:	  it	  expresses	  different	  senses	  in	  different	  contexts.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  now	  standard	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  reasons.2	  An	  objective	  reason	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  or	  action	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  makes	  a	  belief	  or	  action	  advisable	  from	  an	  omniscient	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  that	  takes	  all	  the	  relevant	  facts	  into	  consideration.	  A	  
subjective	  reason,	  in	  contrast,	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  or	  action	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  makes	  a	  belief	  or	  action	  reasonable	  or	  rational	  from	  the	  limited	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  the	  agent.	  The	  word	  ‘reason’	  seems	  to	  pick	  out	  objective	  reasons	  in	  some	  contexts	  and	  subjective	  reasons	  in	  others.	  However,	  this	  chapter	  is	  exclusively	  concerned	  with	  subjective	  reasons,	  rather	  than	  objective	  reasons.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  distinction,	  consider	  Bernard	  Williams’s	  famous	  example:	  	   The	  agent	  believes	  that	  this	  stuff	  is	  gin,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  petrol.	  He	  wants	  a	  gin	  and	  tonic.	  Has	  he	  reason,	  or	  a	  reason,	  to	  mix	  this	  stuff	  with	  tonic	  and	  drink	  it?	  …	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  just	  very	  odd	  to	  say	  that	  he	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  this	  stuff,	  and	  natural	  to	  say	  that	  he	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  drink	  it,	  although	  he	  thinks	  that	  he	  has.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  he	  does	  drink	  it,	  we	  not	  only	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  his	  doing	  so	  (a	  reason	  why	  he	  did	  it),	  but	  we	  have	  such	  an	  explanation	  which	  is	  of	  the	  reason-­‐for-­‐action	  form.	  (1979:	  18)	  	  In	  a	  context	  in	  which	  the	  inadvisability	  of	  drinking	  is	  salient,	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  say,	  as	  Williams	  does,	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  drink	  the	  cocktail.	  But	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  the	  rationality	  of	  drinking	  is	  salient,	  it	  seems	  more	  natural	  to	  say	  that	  he	  has	  a	  reason	  –	  indeed,	  a	  decisive	  one	  –	  to	  drink	  it.	  The	  agent	  has	  a	  subjective	  reason	  to	  drink	  the	  petrol,	  since	  there	  is	  a	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  drinking	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  it	  reasonable.	  But	  the	  agent	  has	  no	  objective	  reason	  to	  drink	  the	  petrol,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  drinking	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  it	  advisable.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  tension	  that	  Williams	  observes	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  noticing	  the	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  the	  word	  ‘reason’.3	  We	  should	  be	  careful	  to	  avoid	  begging	  any	  questions	  by	  assuming	  a	  controversial	  account	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  reasons.	  According	  to	  what	  Mark	  Schroeder	  (2008)	  calls	  the	  Factoring	  Account,	  one	  has	  a	  subjective	  reason	  to	  F	  if	  and	  only	  if	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  reason	  for	  one	  to	  F	  that	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  Sepielli	  (this	  volume)	  for	  further	  discussion.	  A	  related	  distinction	  is	  often	  drawn	  between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  senses	  of	  ‘ought’.	  See	  Kratzer	  (1981)	  and	  Bronfman	  and	  Dowell	  (this	  volume)	  on	  the	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  ‘ought’.	  If	  reasons	  explain	  facts	  about	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  believe	  and	  do,	  as	  proposed	  by	  Broome	  (2013,	  this	  volume),	  then	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  ‘ought’	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  ‘reason’.	  3	  Michael	  Smith	  (1994:	  94-­‐8)	  claims	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  a	  motivating	  reason,	  but	  no	  normative	  reason.	  But	  this	  is	  to	  ignore	  the	  agent’s	  normative	  reason	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  drinking	  in	  the	  subjective	  sense	  by	  making	  it	  reasonable	  or	  rational.	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has	  in	  one’s	  possession.4	  Like	  Schroeder,	  I	  reject	  the	  Factoring	  Account.	  Given	  that	  our	  agent	  has	  no	  objective	  reason	  to	  drink	  the	  petrol,	  the	  Factoring	  Account	  entails	  that	  he	  has	  no	  subjective	  reason	  to	  drink	  it	  either.	  So	  either	  it	  is	  not	  rational	  for	  him	  to	  drink	  the	  petrol	  or	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  him	  to	  drink	  it	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so.	  The	  Factoring	  Account	  therefore	  faces	  a	  dilemma:	  either	  it	  distorts	  our	  conception	  of	  rationality	  or	  it	  preserves	  it	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  sacrificing	  the	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality.	  The	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality	  is	  worth	  preserving,	  since	  it	  illuminates	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  reason	  and	  imposes	  constraints	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons.	  In	  particular,	  a	  theory	  of	  reasons	  is	  answerable	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  rationality.	  I	  assume	  that	  we	  have	  some	  independent	  purchase	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality	  that	  can	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  reasons.	  In	  the	  epistemic	  domain,	  rationality	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  accuracy,	  since	  rational	  beliefs	  can	  be	  false.	  Nor	  is	  rationality	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  consistency	  among	  one’s	  beliefs,	  since	  one’s	  beliefs	  must	  also	  cohere	  with	  one’s	  perceptual	  evidence.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  propose	  an	  account	  of	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perception	  in	  providing	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  that	  respects	  these	  constraints	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  epistemic	  rationality.	  In	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  am	  concerned	  with,	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  contribute	  towards	  making	  those	  beliefs	  reasonable.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  reasonable	  only	  if	  one	  has	  sufficiently	  good	  reasons	  for	  the	  belief.	  Sometimes	  one	  has	  reasons	  for	  belief	  that	  can	  be	  defeated	  –	  that	  is,	  outweighed	  or	  undermined	  –	  by	  better	  reasons	  for	  disbelieving	  or	  withholding	  belief	  instead.	  Such	  reasons	  are	  variously	  described	  as	  pro	  tanto,	  prima	  facie	  or	  defeasible	  reasons.	  If	  one	  has	  reasons	  for	  belief	  that	  are	  defeated	  in	  this	  way,	  then	  one’s	  reasons	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  make	  the	  belief	  in	  question	  reasonable.	  When	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  sufficient	  to	  make	  it	  reasonable,	  then	  I	  will	  say	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  for	  the	  belief.	  Here,	  I	  am	  using	  the	  mass	  noun	  ‘reason’	  instead	  of	  the	  count	  noun	  ‘a	  reason’.	  There	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  senses	  in	  which	  a	  belief	  (or	  an	  action)	  can	  be	  reasonable.5	  A	  belief	  is	  reasonable	  in	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense	  just	  in	  case	  one	  has	  sufficiently	  good	  reasons	  for	  holding	  the	  belief,	  while	  a	  belief	  is	  reasonable	  in	  the	  backward-­‐looking	  sense	  just	  in	  case	  one	  holds	  the	  belief	  for	  sufficiently	  good	  reasons.	  A	  belief	  is	  reasonable	  in	  the	  backward	  looking	  sense	  only	  if	  it	  is	  reasonable	  in	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense,	  but	  not	  vice	  versa.	  The	  backward-­‐looking	  sense	  is	  more	  demanding,	  since	  it	  requires	  not	  only	  having	  good	  reasons	  for	  belief	  or	  action,	  but	  also	  believing	  or	  acting	  for	  those	  reasons.	  There	  is	  a	  related	  distinction	  between	  two	  roles	  that	  reasons	  can	  play:	  a	  normative	  role	  and	  a	  motivating	  role.	  A	  normative	  reason	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  belief	  or	  action,	  whereas	  a	  motivating	  reason	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  which	  someone	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A	  distinction	  is	  often	  drawn	  between	  possessed	  and	  unpossessed	  reasons	  –	  that	  is,	  between	  reasons	  that	  one	  has	  and	  reasons	  that	  there	  are	  but	  that	  one	  does	  not	  have.	  However,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  distinction	  applies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  subjective	  reasons.	  5	  Compare	  Firth’s	  (1978)	  distinction	  between	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  senses	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  Goldman’s	  (1979)	  distinction	  between	  ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  senses	  of	  justifiedness.	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believes	  or	  acts.	  Not	  all	  normative	  reasons	  are	  motivating	  reasons,	  since	  one	  might	  have	  reasons	  for	  belief	  or	  action	  without	  believing	  or	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  reasons.	  Similarly,	  not	  all	  motivating	  reasons	  are	  normative	  reasons,	  since	  one	  might	  believe	  or	  act	  for	  some	  reason	  that	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  at	  all.6	  Debates	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception	  are	  sometimes	  cast	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  justification,	  warrant,	  or	  entitlement,	  rather	  than	  reasons.	  But	  we	  can	  easily	  translate	  back	  and	  forth.	  Just	  as	  reasons	  make	  our	  beliefs	  reasonable,	  so	  justifications	  make	  our	  beliefs	  justified,	  warrants	  make	  our	  beliefs	  warranted,	  and	  entitlements	  make	  us	  entitled	  to	  our	  beliefs.	  These	  phrases	  are	  more	  or	  less	  synonymous	  in	  ordinary	  English,	  although	  some	  epistemologists	  stipulate	  technical	  meanings	  for	  these	  terms	  on	  which	  they	  come	  apart.	  These	  debates	  can	  also	  be	  cast	  in	  terms	  of	  evidence,	  but	  evidence	  is	  best	  regarded	  as	  an	  epistemic	  reason	  for	  belief.	  It	  is	  a	  disputed	  question	  whether	  all	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  evidential	  reasons	  or	  whether	  in	  addition	  there	  are	  pragmatic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  we	  can	  bypass	  this	  dispute,	  since	  only	  evidential	  reasons	  will	  be	  relevant	  in	  this	  chapter.7	  	  
2. The	  ‘How?’	  Question	  How	  does	  perception	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  I	  address	  this	  question	  by	  answering	  three	  challenges	  that	  purport	  to	  show	  that	  perception	  cannot	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world:	  the	  skeptical	  challenge,	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  challenge,	  and	  Davidson’s	  challenge.	  	  
2.1. The	  Skeptical	  Challenge	  Skeptical	  arguments	  purport	  to	  debunk	  the	  commonsense	  assumption	  that	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  There	  are	  many	  different	  forms	  of	  skeptical	  argument,	  but	  here	  is	  an	  influential	  one:	  	   (1) Perception	  provides	  one	  with	  reasons	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  only	  if	  one	  has	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  (2) No	  one	  has	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  Therefore,	  (3) Perception	  provides	  no	  one	  with	  reasons	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  	  The	  argument	  exploits	  an	  epistemic	  circularity.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  one’s	  perceptual	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  depend	  upon	  one’s	  having	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable	  on	  grounds	  that	  are	  independent	  from	  perception.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  no	  one	  has	  such	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable,	  since	  one’s	  only	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable	  depend	  in	  turn	  upon	  perception.	  Responses	  to	  this	  skeptical	  argument	  divide	  into	  at	  least	  two	  categories.	  Some	  reject	  premise	  (2)	  by	  maintaining	  that	  in	  fact	  one	  does	  have	  independent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  McNaughton	  and	  Rawling	  (this	  volume)	  and	  Wiland	  (this	  volume)	  for	  more	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  normative	  and	  motivating	  reasons.	  7	  See	  Reisner	  (this	  volume)	  for	  more	  on	  epistemic	  and	  pragmatic	  reasons.	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reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable	  –	  for	  instance,	  a	  priori	  reasons	  or	  default	  reasons.8	  Others	  reject	  premise	  (1)	  by	  maintaining	  that	  one	  does	  not	  need	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable	  in	  order	  for	  perception	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.9	  This	  division	  corresponds	  closely	  –	  if	  not	  perfectly	  –	  to	  a	  division	  between	  two	  contrasting	  accounts	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.10	  Proponents	  of	  the	  first	  response	  typically	  endorse	  
inferentialism:	  the	  view	  that	  all	  perceptual	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  are	  inferentially	  mediated	  by	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  On	  this	  view,	  all	  perceptual	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  inference	  of	  the	  following	  kind:	  	   (1) I	  am	  having	  a	  perception	  of	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  kind.	  (2) Perception	  is	  reliable:	  so	  if	  I	  am	  having	  a	  perception	  of	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  kind,	  then	  the	  external	  world	  is	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.	  Therefore,	  (3) The	  external	  world	  is	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.	  	  Meanwhile,	  proponents	  of	  the	  second	  response	  typically	  endorse	  noninferentialism:	  the	  view	  that	  some	  perceptual	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  are	  immediate	  or	  noninferential	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  depend	  solely	  on	  perception	  and	  do	  not	  depend	  upon	  reasons	  to	  believe	  anything	  else.	  But	  even	  inferentialism	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  that	  are	  quasi-­‐
immediate	  or	  quasi-­‐noninferential	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  perceptually-­‐based	  reasons	  to	  believe	  anything	  else.	  I	  cannot	  resolve	  the	  debate	  between	  inferentialism	  and	  noninferentialism	  here,	  but	  in	  section	  2.2,	  I	  will	  consider	  how	  this	  debate	  bears	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  avoid	  an	  over-­‐intellectualized	  account	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  	  
2.2. The	  Over-­‐Intellectualization	  Challenge	  In	  section	  1,	  I	  assumed	  that	  perception	  provides	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  by	  providing	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  Some	  epistemologists	  reject	  this	  assumption	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  generates	  an	  over-­‐intellectualized	  account	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  The	  general	  form	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  as	  follows:	  	   (1) Having	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  and	  believing	  for	  those	  reasons,	  requires	  having	  certain	  intellectually	  demanding	  abilities.	  (2) But	  perceptual	  knowledge	  does	  not	  require	  having	  those	  abilities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Wright	  (2004),	  White	  (2006),	  and	  Cohen	  (2010).	  9	  See	  Pollock	  and	  Cruz	  (1999),	  Pryor	  (2000),	  Huemer	  (2001),	  Burge	  (2003),	  Peacocke	  (2004).	  10	  Silins	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  perception	  provides	  noninferential	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  but	  only	  if	  one	  also	  has	  independent	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  So	  he	  endorses	  noninferentialism,	  but	  like	  proponents	  of	  inferentialism,	  he	  accepts	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  skeptical	  argument	  and	  rejects	  the	  second	  premise	  instead.	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(3) Therefore,	  perceptual	  knowledge	  does	  not	  require	  having	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  believing	  for	  those	  reasons.	  	  Tyler	  Burge	  (2003:	  526-­‐30)	  gives	  an	  argument	  of	  this	  form.11	  He	  begins	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  having	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  and	  believing	  for	  reasons,	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  reasoning	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  conceptualization	  of	  reasons.	  Then	  he	  argues	  that	  children	  and	  animals	  can	  acquire	  perceptual	  knowledge	  without	  having	  the	  conceptual	  abilities	  to	  reason	  in	  this	  way.	  He	  writes:	  	   Children	  and	  higher	  non-­‐human	  animals	  do	  not	  have	  reasons	  for	  their	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  They	  lack	  concepts	  like	  reliable,	  normal	  condition,	  perceptual	  state,	  individuation,	  defeating	  condition,	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  having	  such	  reasons.	  Yet	  they	  have	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  There	  is	  no	  sound	  basis	  for	  denying	  that	  epistemology	  can	  evaluate	  these	  beliefs…	  (2003:	  528)	  	  Burge	  concludes	  that	  perceptual	  knowledge	  does	  not	  require	  having	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  or	  believing	  for	  those	  reasons,	  but	  merely	  requires	  a	  less	  demanding	  form	  of	  epistemic	  warrant,	  which	  he	  calls	  “entitlement”.	  In	  response,	  however,	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  of	  perceptual	  reasons.	  We	  need	  not	  accept	  the	  starting	  assumption	  that	  the	  abilities	  involved	  in	  having	  reasons	  and	  believing	  for	  reasons	  are	  any	  more	  intellectually	  demanding	  than	  the	  abilities	  implicated	  in	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Perceptual	  knowledge	  is	  reasonable	  belief	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  reasons	  provided	  by	  perception.	  But	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons	  need	  not	  involve	  reasoning	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  conceptualization	  of	  reasons.	  Instead,	  it	  may	  just	  involve	  forming	  beliefs	  noninferentially	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  requirements	  for	  believing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons	  are	  no	  more	  demanding	  than	  the	  requirements	  for	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Some	  epistemologists	  argue	  that	  avoiding	  the	  over-­‐intellectualization	  problem	  in	  this	  way	  requires	  accepting	  the	  noninferentialist	  view	  that	  perceptual	  reasons	  are	  immediate	  or	  noninferential,	  and	  rejecting	  the	  inferentialist	  view	  that	  perceptual	  reasons	  are	  inferentially	  mediated	  by	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  In	  my	  view,	  however,	  these	  arguments	  are	  inconclusive.12	  First,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  from	  ordinary	  language.	  In	  normal	  conditions,	  I	  can	  explain	  why	  my	  perceptual	  beliefs	  are	  reasonable	  without	  mentioning	  that	  my	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  And	  so	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  noninferentialism	  fits	  best	  with	  ordinary	  language	  while	  inferentialism	  is	  needlessly	  intellectualized.	  In	  reply,	  however,	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  mention	  the	  reliability	  of	  my	  perception	  because	  this	  is	  simply	  assumed	  in	  normal	  conversational	  contexts	  and	  not	  because	  this	  assumption	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  making	  my	  beliefs	  reasonable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Similar	  arguments	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  reliabilism.	  For	  instance,	  Armstrong	  (1968:	  Ch.	  9)	  argues	  that	  reasoning	  is	  required	  for	  believing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons	  and	  hence	  that	  noninferential	  knowledge	  is	  not	  based	  on	  reasons	  at	  all.	  12	  See	  Pryor	  (2000)	  and	  Silins	  (2008)	  for	  related	  arguments	  for	  noninferentialism.	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Second,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  from	  introspection.	  My	  perceptual	  beliefs	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inference	  from	  premises	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception,	  but	  they	  are	  reasonable	  nonetheless.	  But,	  in	  reply,	  inference	  is	  not	  always	  conscious	  and	  so	  it	  need	  not	  reveal	  itself	  upon	  introspection.	  My	  perceptual	  beliefs	  may	  be	  causally	  and	  inferentially	  dependent	  on	  beliefs	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  conscious	  process	  of	  reasoning	  that	  makes	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  inference	  explicit.	  Third,	  there	  is	  an	  argument	  from	  basing.	  The	  argument	  relies	  on	  the	  following	  principle:	  if	  one’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  is	  inferentially	  mediated	  by	  one’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  q,	  then	  one’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  reasonable	  only	  if	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inference	  from	  the	  reasonable	  belief	  that	  q.	  Given	  this	  principle,	  inferentialism	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  non-­‐human	  animals	  and	  human	  infants	  can	  form	  reasonable	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  without	  having	  the	  intellectual	  abilities	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception.	  In	  reply,	  however,	  the	  principle	  is	  false.	  Non-­‐human	  animals	  and	  human	  infants	  need	  not	  conceptualize	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception	  so	  long	  as	  their	  beliefs	  are	  held	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  causally	  sensitive	  to	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception.	  This	  need	  not	  require	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  intellectual	  sophistication,	  since	  a	  causal	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception	  can	  be	  manifested	  in	  one’s	  responses	  to	  defeaters	  –	  say,	  by	  withholding	  belief	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  evidence	  that	  one’s	  perception	  is	  unreliable.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  can	  remain	  neutral	  on	  the	  debate	  between	  noninferentialism	  and	  inferentialism,	  since	  both	  views	  raise	  the	  same	  question	  that	  is	  the	  main	  topic	  of	  this	  chapter	  –	  namely,	  what	  must	  perception	  be	  like	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  	  
2.3. Davidson’s	  Challenge	  According	  to	  Donald	  Davidson,	  “Nothing	  can	  count	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  holding	  a	  belief	  except	  another	  belief”	  (1986:	  310).	  Davidson	  seems	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  all	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  identical	  with	  psychological	  states	  of	  belief,	  rather	  than	  their	  contents,	  but	  this	  thesis	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons	  is	  not	  crucial	  here.	  All	  we	  need	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  all	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  provided	  by	  other	  beliefs.	  Call	  this	  Davidson’s	  thesis.	  Davidson’s	  thesis	  entails	  that	  if	  perception	  is	  distinct	  from	  belief,	  then	  perception	  cannot	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  According	  to	  Davidson,	  perception	  
causes	  belief,	  but	  cannot	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  and	  so	  cannot	  make	  them	  reasonable,	  rational,	  or	  justified.	  Instead,	  beliefs	  are	  justified	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  relations	  –	  in	  particular,	  relations	  of	  coherence	  –	  with	  other	  beliefs.13	  The	  rationale	  for	  Davidson’s	  thesis	  (i.e.	  that	  only	  beliefs	  justify	  other	  beliefs)	  depends	  on	  two	  background	  assumptions.	  The	  first	  assumption	  is	  what	  James	  Pryor	  calls	  “the	  Premise	  Principle”:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  also	  BonJour	  (1985).	  This	  view	  is	  sometimes	  known	  as	  pure	  coherentism.	  It	  is	  distinguished	  from	  impure	  coherentism	  on	  which	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  but	  only	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  beliefs.	  The	  view	  Haack	  (1995)	  dubs	  “foundherentism”	  is	  naturally	  interpreted	  as	  a	  version	  of	  impure	  coherentism.	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The	  Premise	  Principle:	  The	  only	  things	  that	  can	  justify	  a	  belief	  that	  p	  are	  other	  states	  that	  assertively	  represent	  propositions,	  and	  those	  propositions	  have	  to	  be	  ones	  that	  could	  be	  used	  as	  premises	  in	  an	  argument	  for	  p.	  They	  have	  to	  stand	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  inferential	  relation	  to	  p:	  they	  have	  to	  imply	  it	  or	  inductively	  support	  it	  or	  something	  like	  that.	  (2005:	  189)	  	  The	  Premise	  Principle	  is	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  epistemology	  of	  introspection.	  For	  instance,	  the	  feeling	  of	  visualizing	  color	  is	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  me	  in	  believing	  that	  I	  have	  this	  feeling,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  represent	  anything	  from	  which	  it	  follows	  (deductively	  or	  inductively)	  that	  I	  have	  this	  feeling.	  The	  feeling	  represents	  color,	  but	  not	  that	  I	  am	  visualizing	  color.	  Or	  so	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suppose.	  Some	  philosophers	  endorse	  a	  self-­‐representational	  theory	  of	  conscious	  experience	  on	  which	  all	  experiences	  represent	  themselves.14	  But	  this	  is	  a	  controversial	  theory	  and	  it	  would	  be	  rash	  to	  endorse	  it	  just	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  Premise	  Principle.	  Instead,	  we	  can	  restrict	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  so	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  perception,	  but	  not	  introspection.	  Perception	  must	  represent	  the	  external	  world	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.15	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  because	  my	  visual	  experience	  represents	  that	  the	  lights	  are	  on	  that	  I	  now	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  lights	  are	  on.	  If	  my	  visual	  experience	  were	  comprised	  of	  brute	  sensations	  or	  “qualia”	  with	  no	  representational	  content,	  then	  it	  would	  give	  me	  no	  more	  reason	  to	  believe	  one	  thing	  rather	  than	  any	  other.	  Moreover,	  perception	  must	  represent	  the	  external	  world	  with	  assertive	  force	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  must	  purport	  to	  tell	  me	  what	  the	  external	  world	  is	  like.	  Visualizing	  that	  the	  lights	  are	  on	  gives	  me	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  lights	  are	  on	  because	  it	  lacks	  the	  assertive	  force	  of	  visual	  perception.16	  Davidson’s	  second	  assumption	  is	  that	  perceptual	  experiences,	  unlike	  beliefs,	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  external	  world.	  On	  his	  view,	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  brute	  sensations	  that	  have	  phenomenal	  character	  but	  lack	  representational	  force	  or	  content.	  As	  such,	  they	  fail	  to	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  the	  Premise	  Principle.	  As	  Davidson	  says,	  “The	  relation	  between	  a	  sensation	  and	  a	  belief	  cannot	  be	  logical,	  since	  sensations	  are	  not	  beliefs	  or	  other	  propositional	  attitudes”	  (1986:	  311).	  Davidson’s	  challenge	  can	  now	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  Horgan	  and	  Kriegel	  (2007)	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  introspection	  that	  incorporates	  commitment	  to	  the	  self-­‐representational	  theory	  of	  consciousness.	  15	  McDowell	  (1994)	  and	  Brewer	  (2005)	  argue	  that	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perception	  must	  be	  conceptually	  structured	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  but	  see	  Heck	  (2000)	  and	  Peacocke	  (2001)	  for	  criticism.	  I	  assume	  that	  experience	  has	  representational	  content,	  while	  remaining	  neutral	  on	  the	  further	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  has	  conceptual	  structure.	  This	  is	  a	  fairly	  minimal	  assumption.	  For	  instance,	  Siegel	  (2011:	  Ch.	  2)	  and	  Logue	  (2014)	  argue	  that	  even	  naïve	  realism	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  experience	  has	  representational	  content.	  16	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  assertive	  force	  of	  perception,	  see	  Pryor	  (2000:	  547,	  n.	  37),	  Heck	  (2000),	  and	  Chudnoff	  (2012).	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(1) The	  Premise	  Principle:	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  only	  if	  it	  assertively	  represents	  the	  external	  world.	  (2) Perception	  does	  not	  assertively	  represent	  the	  external	  world.	  Therefore,	  (3) Davidson’s	  thesis:	  perception	  does	  not	  provide	  reasons	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  	  Let	  us	  assume	  that	  the	  Premise	  Principle	  is	  correct	  (at	  least	  in	  its	  restricted	  form)	  and	  hence	  that	  perception	  must	  assertively	  represent	  the	  external	  world	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  Even	  so,	  Davidson’s	  argument	  can	  be	  blocked	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  second	  assumption	  is	  false:	  perception	  does	  assertively	  represent	  the	  external	  world.	  This	  response	  takes	  different	  forms	  depending	  on	  whether	  one	  endorses	  a	  doxastic	  or	  non-­‐doxastic	  theory	  of	  perception.	  The	  doxastic	  theory	  identifies	  perception	  with	  belief,	  or	  with	  some	  related	  doxastic	  state	  such	  as	  the	  event	  of	  acquiring	  a	  belief,	  or	  the	  conscious	  manifestation	  of	  belief	  in	  judgment,	  or	  the	  feeling	  of	  conscious	  inclination	  towards	  judgment.17	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Davidson’s	  assumption	  that	  only	  doxastic	  states	  like	  beliefs	  are	  capable	  of	  representing	  the	  external	  world	  and	  thereby	  justifying	  other	  beliefs.	  By	  identifying	  perception	  with	  belief,	  however,	  the	  doxastic	  theory	  of	  perception	  blocks	  the	  argument	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  perception	  cannot	  justify	  belief.	  There	  are	  several	  compelling	  objections	  to	  the	  doxastic	  theory.	  Some	  objections	  target	  the	  claim	  that	  belief	  is	  necessary	  for	  perception.	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  known	  illusions:	  in	  the	  Muller-­‐Lyer	  illusion,	  my	  perception	  represents	  that	  the	  lines	  are	  unequal	  in	  length,	  but	  I	  don’t	  believe	  this,	  since	  I	  know	  about	  the	  illusion.	  Second,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  inattentional	  blindness:	  my	  perception	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  cufflink	  in	  the	  drawer,	  but	  I	  don’t	  form	  the	  belief	  because	  I’m	  not	  paying	  attention	  and	  so	  I	  don’t	  notice	  it.	  Third,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  cognitive	  sophistication:	  some	  primitive	  creatures,	  such	  as	  jumping	  spiders,	  have	  perceptual	  systems	  that	  represent	  the	  external	  world	  without	  having	  any	  associated	  cognitive	  system.	  These	  are	  all	  serious	  problems,	  but	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  objections	  that	  target	  the	  claim	  that	  belief	  is	  sufficient	  for	  perception.	  	  The	  first	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  doxastic	  theory	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  distinctive	  
phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception.	  Beliefs	  themselves	  have	  no	  phenomenal	  character	  –	  they	  are	  standing	  states	  that	  persist	  through	  periods	  in	  which	  one	  has	  no	  conscious	  experience	  at	  all,	  such	  as	  dreamless	  sleep.	  Beliefs	  are	  disposed	  to	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  conscious	  experience	  as	  occurrent	  events	  of	  thinking	  and	  judging,	  but	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  cognitive	  experience	  is	  quite	  unlike	  that	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  A	  patient	  with	  blindsight,	  for	  example,	  could	  form	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  about	  the	  external	  world	  without	  thereby	  experiencing	  the	  distinctive	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception.18	  The	  second	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  doxastic	  theory	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  distinctive	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perception.	  Perception	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  play	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  Armstrong	  (1968),	  Pitcher	  (1971)	  and	  Gluer	  (2009).	  Byrne	  (2009)	  says	  that	  perception	  “constitutively	  involves”	  belief,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  identify	  perception	  with	  belief,	  so	  his	  view	  is	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  sufficiency	  objections	  raised	  below.	  18	  See	  Weiskrantz	  (1997)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  empirical	  work	  on	  blindsight.	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foundational	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  beliefs	  without	  itself	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  Beliefs,	  in	  contrast,	  cannot	  justify	  other	  beliefs	  unless	  they	  are	  justified	  themselves.	  Given	  Davidson’s	  assumption	  that	  only	  beliefs	  can	  justify	  other	  beliefs,	  this	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  either	  an	  infinite	  regress	  of	  justification	  or	  a	  closed	  circle	  of	  justification.	  Perception	  is	  a	  good	  candidate	  to	  block	  the	  threat	  of	  infinite	  regress	  or	  vicious	  circularity	  because	  it	  can	  justify	  belief	  without	  needing	  justification.	  Since	  beliefs	  cannot	  justify	  beliefs	  without	  needing	  justification,	  it	  follows	  that	  perception	  is	  distinct	  from	  belief.	  These	  two	  objections	  to	  the	  doxastic	  theory	  –	  its	  failure	  to	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception	  and	  its	  epistemic	  role	  –	  are	  intimately	  related.	  As	  I	  will	  explain,	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  that	  perception	  plays	  its	  epistemic	  role.	  The	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception	  is	  what	  sets	  it	  apart	  from	  belief	  and	  explains	  why	  it	  is	  uniquely	  suited	  to	  play	  its	  foundational	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  belief	  without	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  Laurence	  BonJour,	  following	  Wilfrid	  Sellars,	  argues	  that	  nothing	  can	  justify	  belief	  without	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  He	  writes:	  	   For	  it	  is	  clear	  on	  reflection	  that	  it	  is	  one	  and	  the	  same	  feature	  of	  a	  cognitive	  state,	  namely,	  its	  assertive	  or	  at	  least	  representational	  content,	  which	  both	  enables	  it	  to	  confer	  justification	  on	  other	  states	  and	  also	  creates	  the	  need	  for	  it	  to	  be	  itself	  justified—thus	  making	  it	  impossible	  in	  principle	  to	  separate	  these	  two	  aspects.	  (1985:	  78)	  	  BonJour	  assumes	  here	  that	  all	  representational	  states	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  This	  follows	  from	  Davidson’s	  assumption	  that	  all	  representational	  states	  are	  beliefs,	  given	  that	  all	  beliefs	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  But	  if	  Davidson’s	  assumption	  is	  false,	  as	  the	  nondoxastic	  theory	  claims,	  then	  BonJour’s	  argument	  collapses.	  Even	  so,	  the	  argument	  poses	  an	  important	  challenge	  –	  namely,	  to	  identify	  what	  sets	  perception	  apart	  from	  belief	  and	  explains	  how	  it	  can	  play	  its	  foundational	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  beliefs	  without	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  On	  the	  non-­‐doxastic	  theory,	  perceptions	  are	  non-­‐doxastic	  states	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  the	  beliefs	  and	  other	  doxastic	  states	  that	  they	  cause	  and	  justify.	  These	  non-­‐doxastic	  states	  assertively	  represent	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  they	  have	  a	  distinctive	  phenomenal	  character	  that	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  beliefs	  and	  other	  doxastic	  states.	  Moreover,	  the	  representational	  force	  and	  content	  of	  perception	  is	  not	  wholly	  independent	  from	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception	  is	  intrinsically	  representational.	  One	  cannot	  coherently	  imagine	  someone	  whose	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  the	  very	  same	  phenomenal	  character	  as	  one’s	  own	  but	  none	  of	  the	  same	  representational	  force	  or	  content.	  And	  this	  is	  because	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  representational	  force	  and	  content	  that	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  its	  phenomenal	  character.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  McGinn	  (1988),	  Siewert	  (1998),	  Horgan	  and	  Tienson	  (2002)	  and	  Chalmers	  (2004)	  for	  related	  proposals.	  Note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  commitment	  here	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  representational	  contents	  of	  perception	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  its	  phenomenal	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BonJour’s	  challenge	  is	  to	  explain	  why	  perception,	  unlike	  belief,	  is	  suited	  to	  play	  its	  foundational	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  belief	  without	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  perception	  is	  distinguished	  from	  belief	  by	  the	  distinctive	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  represents	  the	  external	  world.	  It	  is	  because	  perception	  represents	  the	  external	  world	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  distinctive	  phenomenal	  character	  that	  it	  is	  uniquely	  suited	  to	  play	  its	  foundational	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  belief	  without	  standing	  in	  need	  of	  justification.20	  The	  force	  of	  Davidson’s	  challenge	  relies	  on	  an	  implausible	  separation	  between	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  representational	  content.	  The	  mind	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  are	  sensations	  that	  have	  phenomenal	  character	  but	  no	  representational	  content,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  are	  beliefs	  and	  other	  propositional	  attitudes	  that	  have	  representational	  content	  but	  no	  phenomenal	  character.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  both	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  representational	  content.	  If	  we	  identify	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  belief,	  then	  we	  cannot	  accommodate	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  but	  if	  we	  identify	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  sensation,	  then	  we	  cannot	  accommodate	  its	  representational	  content.	  And	  if	  we	  identify	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  a	  conjunction	  of	  the	  two,	  then	  we	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  intrinsic	  connection	  between	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  and	  its	  representational	  content.	  
	  
3. The	  ‘When?’	  Question	  What	  are	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  In	  section	  2,	  I	  argued	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  must	  assertively	  represent	  the	  external	  world	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  explore	  whether	  this	  condition	  is	  not	  only	  necessary	  but	  also	  sufficient.	  Is	  it	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  that	  it	  assertively	  represents	  the	  external	  world?	  Or	  are	  there	  further	  conditions	  –	  such	  as	  reliability,	  truth,	  or	  knowledge	  –	  that	  must	  be	  satisfied	  in	  addition?	  I	  propose	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  views:	  	  
• The	  Content	  View:	  One	  has	  defeasible,	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  
p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  p.21	  	  
• The	  Knowledge	  View:	  One	  has	  defeasible,	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  perceives	  that	  p	  and	  thereby	  knows	  that	  p.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  character.	  Some	  representational	  contents	  of	  perception	  may	  depend	  upon	  extrinsic	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  environment.	  20	  See	  Smithies	  (forthcoming)	  for	  a	  more	  extended	  discussion	  and	  defence	  of	  the	  role	  of	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception.	  21	  Proponents	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  include	  Pryor	  (2000),	  Huemer	  (2001),	  Peacocke	  (2004),	  Silins	  (2008),	  and	  Smithies	  (forthcoming).	  
	   13	  
	  The	  restriction	  to	  noninferential	  reasons	  is	  designed	  to	  set	  aside	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  believe,	  say,	  that	  it’s	  just	  been	  raining	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  visual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  the	  pavement	  is	  wet.	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  prejudge	  the	  debate	  between	  inferentialism	  and	  noninferentialism,	  so	  we	  can	  leave	  this	  debate	  open	  by	  including	  quasi-­‐noninferential	  reasons	  for	  belief	  that	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  perceptually-­‐based	  reasons	  to	  believe	  anything	  else	  (see	  section	  2.1).	  The	  Content	  View	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  are	  not	  exhaustive	  options.	  There	  is	  a	  whole	  spectrum	  of	  intermediate	  views	  on	  which	  assertively	  representing	  the	  external	  world	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  and	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  is	  not	  necessary,	  for	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  provide	  noninferential	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  For	  instance,	  there	  are	  versions	  of	  Reliabilism	  on	  which	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  that	  p	  provides	  sufficient	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  reliably	  indicates	  that	  p.23	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  Content	  View	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  because	  intermediate	  views	  fall	  within	  the	  target	  range	  of	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  these	  more	  extreme	  views.	  These	  options	  are	  exclusive	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  exhaustive.	  They	  differ	  in	  extension	  given	  the	  assumption	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  can	  represent	  some	  of	  the	  same	  contents	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  has	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Let	  us	  stipulate	  that	  in	  the	  good	  case	  one	  has	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  p,	  whereas	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  has	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  p	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  p.	  Moreover,	  one	  has	  no	  defeating	  reasons	  in	  either	  case.	  The	  Content	  View	  says	  that	  one	  has	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike,	  whereas	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  says	  that	  one	  has	  reasons	  only	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  Given	  this	  extensional	  difference,	  bad	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  provide	  a	  good	  test	  case	  for	  deciding	  between	  these	  views.	  In	  section	  3.1,	  I’ll	  present	  an	  argument	  from	  parity	  against	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  	  
3.1. The	  Argument	  from	  Parity	  Here	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  parity:	  	   (1) Subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  equally	  rational	  insofar	  as	  they	  hold	  the	  same	  beliefs.	  (2) If	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  equally	  rational	  insofar	  as	  they	  hold	  the	  same	  beliefs,	  then	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  (3) Therefore,	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Proponents	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  include	  Unger	  (1975),	  McDowell	  (1995),	  Hyman	  (1999),	  Williamson	  (2000,	  2007),	  Sutton	  (2007),	  Littlejohn	  (2012,	  this	  volume),	  Pritchard	  (2012),	  Byrne	  (2014),	  Hawthorne	  and	  Magidor	  (this	  volume).	  23	  Proponents	  of	  Reliabilism	  include	  Goldman	  (1979),	  Sosa	  (1991),	  Burge	  (2003),	  Bergmann	  (2006),	  and	  Lyons	  (2009),	  although	  they	  disagree	  among	  themselves	  about	  how	  the	  reliability	  condition	  is	  to	  be	  understood.	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  The	  argument	  from	  parity	  purports	  to	  establish	  that	  subjects	  have	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  But	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  entails	  that	  subjects	  do	  not	  have	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  So	  if	  the	  argument	  from	  parity	  is	  sound,	  then	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  false.24	  Proponents	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  can	  respond	  to	  this	  argument	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways.	  The	  bold	  response	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  first	  premise:	  subjects	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  less	  rational	  than	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  The	  more	  cautious	  response	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  first	  premise	  and	  reject	  the	  second:	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  equally	  rational,	  although	  they	  do	  not	  have	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  I’ll	  consider	  each	  of	  these	  responses	  in	  turn.	  The	  bold	  response	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  swallow.	  Suppose	  that	  Macbeth	  undergoes	  a	  gradual	  transition	  from	  the	  good	  case	  of	  knowing	  by	  perception	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  to	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  merely	  hallucinating	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.25	  The	  transition	  is	  “seamless”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Macbeth	  cannot	  know	  by	  introspection	  that	  the	  transition	  is	  occurring.	  Moreover,	  it	  makes	  no	  relevant	  impact	  on	  his	  beliefs,	  so	  he	  continues	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  dagger	  before	  him	  with	  the	  same	  high	  level	  of	  confidence.	  What	  is	  hard	  to	  swallow	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  rationality	  requires	  Macbeth	  to	  abandon	  his	  belief	  or	  to	  reduce	  his	  confidence	  with	  the	  result	  that	  he	  is	  rational	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  transition	  and	  irrational	  by	  the	  end.	  Some	  proponents	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  respond	  by	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  rationality	  and	  blamelessness.26	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one’s	  beliefs	  are	  irrational,	  since	  does	  not	  have	  reasons	  for	  one’s	  beliefs,	  but	  one	  nevertheless	  has	  a	  good	  excuse	  for	  holding	  them	  –	  namely,	  that	  one	  is	  in	  a	  case	  that	  is	  indiscriminable	  by	  reflection	  from	  the	  good	  case.	  Since	  one	  has	  such	  an	  excuse,	  one	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  forming	  these	  beliefs,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  one	  has	  reasons	  for	  those	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  bad	  case,	  one	  is	  blameless,	  but	  irrational.	  Everyone	  should	  agree	  that	  blameless	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  rationality.	  This	  is	  best	  illustrated	  by	  examples	  in	  which	  victims	  of	  brainwashing,	  drugs,	  or	  mental	  illness	  form	  irrational	  beliefs	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own.	  Consider	  a	  patient	  with	  Capgras	  delusion	  who	  believes	  her	  spouse	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  an	  imposter	  or	  a	  patient	  with	  Cotard	  delusion	  who	  believes	  he	  is	  dead.	  We	  do	  not	  blame	  patients	  for	  holding	  these	  irrational	  beliefs	  because	  of	  their	  cognitive	  disorder.	  Intuitively,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  rational	  disparity	  between	  perceptual	  illusion	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  cognitive	  delusion	  on	  the	  other.	  Our	  evaluations	  of	  rationality	  are	  sensitive	  to	  a	  distinction	  between	  false	  belief	  owing	  to	  perceptual	  malfunction	  and	  false	  belief	  owing	  to	  cognitive	  malfunction.	  Both	  are	  blameless,	  but	  the	  former	  is	  rational,	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  not.	  This	  distinction	  is	  obscured	  if	  we	  maintain	  that	  both	  are	  cases	  of	  blameless	  irrationality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  A	  similar	  argument	  can	  be	  run	  against	  intermediate	  views,	  such	  as	  Reliabilism.	  See	  Cohen	  (1984)	  for	  an	  early	  version	  of	  this	  argument.	  25	  The	  transition	  must	  be	  very	  gradual	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  violating	  the	  safety	  condition	  for	  knowledge.	  But	  the	  transition	  is	  mainly	  for	  dramatic	  effect:	  we	  can	  also	  compare	  Macbeth	  in	  the	  good	  case	  with	  his	  duplicate	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  26	  See	  Williamson	  (2007),	  Littlejohn	  (2009),	  Pritchard	  (2012),	  Byrne	  (2014).	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Can	  proponents	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  capture	  the	  intuitive	  basis	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  cognitive	  delusion	  while	  maintaining	  that	  both	  are	  cases	  of	  blameless	  irrationality?	  Timothy	  Williamson	  (forthcoming)	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  being	  rational	  and	  merely	  being	  disposed	  to	  be	  rational.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  while	  victims	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  are	  not	  rational	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  disposed	  to	  be	  rational	  in	  the	  good	  case,	  whereas	  patients	  with	  cognitive	  delusions	  are	  neither	  rational	  nor	  disposed	  to	  be	  rational.	  Here	  is	  a	  dilemma	  for	  Williamson’s	  proposal.	  Do	  we	  manifest	  the	  same	  dispositions	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case?	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  beliefs	  that	  result	  from	  these	  dispositions	  are	  equally	  rational	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case,	  since	  a	  belief	  is	  rational	  just	  in	  case	  it	  results	  from	  manifesting	  a	  rational	  disposition.	  If	  not,	  then	  the	  proposal	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  intuitive	  basis	  of	  the	  distinction.	  Williamson’s	  proposal	  is	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  avoid	  the	  first	  horn.	  On	  his	  view,	  the	  victim	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  has	  a	  general	  disposition	  to	  be	  rational,	  but	  the	  disposition	  is	  not	  manifested	  because	  “the	  unfavorable	  circumstances	  block	  those	  manifestations”.	  For	  purposes	  of	  comparison,	  he	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  Connie,	  a	  generally	  competent	  mathematician	  who	  believes	  contradictions	  when	  she	  is	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  brain-­‐scrambling	  machine.	  She	  does	  what	  a	  person	  with	  rational	  dispositions	  would	  do	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  thereby	  manifest	  a	  rational	  disposition,	  and	  so	  her	  beliefs	  are	  not	  rational.	  Intuitively,	  however,	  the	  victim	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  is	  more	  rational	  than	  Connie	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  even	  if	  their	  general	  dispositions	  are	  equally	  rational.	  Compare	  two	  victims	  of	  perceptual	  illusion:	  one	  who	  forms	  beliefs	  in	  conformity	  with	  her	  experience,	  while	  the	  other	  believes	  in	  contradiction	  with	  her	  experience,	  owing	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  brain-­‐scrambling	  machine.	  Both	  subjects	  are	  blameless,	  and	  both	  have	  generally	  rational	  dispositions,	  but	  only	  the	  former	  exercises	  a	  rational	  disposition	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  Williamson’s	  proposal	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  intuitive	  basis	  of	  this	  distinction	  and	  thereby	  falls	  on	  the	  second	  horn.	  The	  more	  cautious	  response	  to	  the	  parity	  argument	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  first	  premise	  and	  reject	  the	  second.	  On	  this	  view,	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  can	  be	  equally	  rational	  without	  having	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  This	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality	  proposed	  in	  section	  1.	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  connection	  seems	  plausible,	  and	  even	  platitudinous,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  recently	  challenged	  by	  various	  prominent	  figures	  including	  Derek	  Parfit	  and	  John	  Broome.	  As	  I’ll	  explain,	  however,	  their	  objections	  are	  unconvincing	  Parfit	  proposes	  the	  following	  counterexample	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  rationality	  requires	  having	  and	  responding	  to	  reasons:	  	   Suppose	  that,	  while	  walking	  in	  some	  desert,	  you	  have	  disturbed	  and	  angered	  some	  poisonous	  snake.	  You	  believe	  that,	  to	  save	  your	  life,	  you	  must	  run	  away.	  In	  fact	  you	  must	  stand	  still,	  since	  this	  snake	  will	  attack	  only	  moving	  targets.	  (2011:	  34)	  	  Parfit	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  to	  stand	  still	  and	  that	  the	  rational	  course	  of	  action	  is	  rather	  to	  run	  away.	  But	  he	  denies	  that	  you	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  run	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away,	  and	  claims	  instead	  that	  you	  have	  decisive	  reason	  to	  stand	  still,	  since	  that	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  avoid	  a	  snakebite.	  The	  disagreement	  has	  a	  purely	  terminological	  component.	  Recall	  the	  distinction	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  reasons	  drawn	  in	  section	  1.	  Parfit’s	  example	  shows	  that	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  objective	  reasons,	  but	  it	  does	  nothing	  to	  undermine	  the	  claim	  that	  rationality	  requires	  subjective	  reasons.	  In	  this	  example,	  objective	  and	  subjective	  reasons	  come	  apart:	  you	  have	  a	  decisive	  subjective	  reason	  to	  run	  away,	  but	  a	  decisive	  objective	  reason	  to	  stand	  still.	  But	  the	  disagreement	  also	  has	  a	  substantive	  component.	  When	  Parfit	  considers	  the	  response	  that	  false	  beliefs	  can	  provide	  reasons,	  he	  replies,	  “these	  reasons	  do	  not	  have	  any	  normative	  force,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  any	  action”	  (2011:	  35).	  But	  this	  is	  just	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  only	  sense	  in	  which	  reasons	  can	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  action	  is	  the	  objective	  sense,	  rather	  than	  the	  subjective	  sense.	  Parfit	  gives	  no	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  reasons	  cannot	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  action	  in	  the	  subjective	  sense	  that	  they	  contribute	  towards	  making	  them	  reasonable	  or	  rational.	  Broome	  argues	  that	  rationality	  comes	  apart	  from	  reasons	  in	  cases	  of	  rational	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  one’s	  reasons.	  He	  writes:	  	   It	  can	  happen	  that	  your	  reasons	  require	  you	  to	  F	  but	  you	  do	  not	  believe	  your	  reasons	  require	  you	  to	  F.	  Furthermore,	  this	  can	  happen	  even	  if	  you	  are	  rational.	  Suppose	  it	  does.	  Since	  you	  do	  not	  believe	  your	  reasons	  require	  you	  to	  F,	  you	  may	  rationally	  fail	  to	  F.	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  your	  reasons	  require	  you	  to	  F,	  you	  may	  be	  rational	  even	  if	  you	  do	  not	  F.	  (2013:	  74)	  	  The	  argument	  assumes	  that	  there	  can	  be	  rational	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  what	  one	  has	  reasons	  to	  do.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  objective	  reasons,	  but	  is	  it	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  subjective	  reasons?	  In	  section	  3.2	  below,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  subjective	  reasons	  are	  luminous	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  rules	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  rational	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  one’s	  reasons.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  one’s	  reasons	  always	  constitutes	  some	  departure	  from	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  make	  one	  irrational	  by	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  	  
3.2. The	  Argument	  from	  Luminosity	  Here	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  luminosity:	  	   (1) One’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  action	  are	  luminous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  always	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  which	  reasons	  one	  has.	  (2) If	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  true,	  then	  one’s	  reasons	  are	  not	  luminous.	  (3) Therefore,	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  false.	  	  A	  similar	  form	  of	  argument	  applies	  to	  any	  view	  that	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  luminosity	  of	  reasons,	  but	  I’ll	  focus	  on	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  Once	  again,	  there	  are	  two	  responses	  available	  to	  proponents	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  The	  bold	  response	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  first	  premise	  by	  denying	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  luminous.	  The	  more	  cautious	  response	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  first	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premise	  and	  reject	  the	  second	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  thesis	  that	  reasons	  are	  luminous.	  I’ll	  consider	  these	  responses	  in	  turn.	  First,	  why	  suppose	  that	  reasons	  are	  luminous?	  One	  important	  motivation	  is	  to	  guarantee	  the	  irrationality	  of	  akrasia	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  believing	  and	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  conflict	  with	  one’s	  beliefs	  about	  how	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  one	  to	  believe	  and	  act.	  Consider	  the	  following	  level-­‐bridging	  principle:	  	  
• The	  Level-­‐Bridging	  Principle:	  One	  has	  reason	  to	  φ	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ.	  	  If	  the	  left-­‐to-­‐right	  direction	  is	  false,	  then	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  it’s	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  φ,	  although	  it’s	  not	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  φ.	  But	  if	  it’s	  not	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  rationally	  permissible	  either	  to	  disbelieve	  or	  to	  withhold	  belief	  instead.	  However,	  it	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  φ	  while	  disbelieving	  or	  withholding	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  φ,	  given	  the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  akrasia	  is	  always	  irrational.	  So	  the	  left-­‐to-­‐right	  direction	  is	  true	  after	  all.	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  right-­‐to-­‐left	  direction	  is	  false,	  then	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  it’s	  rational	  to	  believe	  that	  it’s	  rationally	  required	  to	  φ,	  but	  it’s	  not	  rationally	  required	  to	  φ.	  But	  if	  it’s	  not	  rationally	  required	  to	  φ,	  then	  it	  is	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  refrain	  from	  φing.	  However,	  since	  akrasia	  is	  always	  irrational,	  it	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  permissible	  to	  refrain	  from	  φing	  while	  believing	  that	  it’s	  rationally	  required	  to	  φ.	  So	  the	  right-­‐to-­‐left	  direction	  is	  also	  true.27	  The	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  ensures	  that	  one’s	  reasons	  are	  luminous	  by	  ruling	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  rational	  uncertainty	  and	  error	  about	  one’s	  reasons.	  Moreover,	  it	  rules	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  higher-­‐level	  Gettier	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ,	  and	  it	  is	  true	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ,	  but	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ	  because	  there	  is	  a	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ.	  After	  all,	  it	  entails	  that	  any	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  φ	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  one	  does	  in	  fact	  have	  reason	  to	  φ.	  Williamson	  (2000:	  Ch.	  4)	  opts	  for	  the	  bold	  response.	  He	  gives	  an	  argument	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  establish	  that	  nothing	  is	  luminous.	  The	  argument	  relies	  on	  a	  plausible	  empirical	  assumption	  that	  our	  powers	  of	  discrimination	  are	  limited	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  we	  are	  not	  safe	  from	  error	  in	  borderline	  cases.	  For	  any	  condition	  C,	  there	  is	  some	  borderline	  case	  in	  which	  C	  obtains	  and	  there	  is	  a	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  falsely	  believes	  that	  C	  obtains.	  Now	  assume	  a	  safety	  condition	  for	  knowledge,	  which	  states	  that	  one	  knows	  that	  C	  obtains	  only	  if	  there	  is	  no	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  falsely	  believes	  that	  C	  obtains.	  For	  any	  condition	  C,	  we	  can	  find	  examples	  in	  which	  C	  obtains	  but	  one	  fails	  to	  know	  that	  C	  obtains.	  Does	  it	  follow	  that	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  C	  obtains?	  In	  response	  to	  Williamson,	  I	  have	  drawn	  a	  distinction	  (see	  Smithies	  2012b)	  between	  epistemic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  Smithies	  (2012a)	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  presentation	  of	  this	  argument	  in	  the	  case	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  or	  justification	  for	  belief.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  the	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  is	  regressive,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  infinite	  regress	  is	  benign.	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and	  doxastic	  interpretations	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p.	  In	  the	  doxastic	  sense,	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p	  only	  if	  there	  is	  no	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  falsely	  believes	  that	  p.	  But	  in	  the	  epistemic	  sense,	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p	  so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  no	  close	  case	  in	  which	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  p.	  Even	  if	  Williamson’s	  argument	  succeeds	  in	  showing	  that	  nothing	  is	  luminous	  in	  the	  doxastic	  sense,	  it	  fails	  to	  show	  that	  nothing	  is	  luminous	  in	  the	  epistemic	  sense.	  Moreover,	  the	  argument	  against	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  can	  be	  run	  using	  the	  epistemic	  sense	  of	  luminosity.	  So	  Williamson’s	  bold	  response	  fails.	  The	  more	  cautious	  response	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  luminosity	  of	  reasons.	  John	  McDowell	  (2011)	  and	  Duncan	  Pritchard	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  one’s	  reasons	  are	  weakly	  luminous	  but	  not	  strongly	  
luminous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  reasons	  is	  luminous,	  although	  the	  absence	  of	  reasons	  is	  not.	  In	  the	  good	  case,	  one	  has	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  one	  has	  those	  reasons.	  In	  the	  bad	  case,	  in	  contrast,	  one	  lacks	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  but	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  one	  lacks	  those	  reasons.	  So	  the	  bad	  case	  generates	  counterexamples	  to	  strong	  luminosity,	  but	  not	  weak	  luminosity.	  Is	  weak	  luminosity	  strong	  enough?	  One	  might	  reject	  strong	  luminosity	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  too	  strong.	  Consider	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  an	  object	  such	  that	  you	  cannot	  entertain	  those	  proposition	  unless	  you	  stand	  in	  some	  specified	  relation,	  such	  as	  a	  perceptual	  relation,	  to	  the	  object.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  for	  entertaining	  those	  propositions,	  then	  they	  are	  epistemically	  inert	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  adopt	  towards	  them.	  But	  now	  we	  can	  give	  counterexamples	  to	  strong	  luminosity	  in	  which	  there	  is	  an	  epistemically	  inert	  proposition	  that	  p	  such	  that	  one	  lacks	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  while	  also	  lacking	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  lacks	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  Arguably,	  however,	  de	  re	  propositions	  are	  a	  special	  case.	  For	  any	  proposition	  that	  one	  can	  entertain,	  there	  is	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt:	  if	  one	  lacks	  reason	  either	  to	  believe	  or	  disbelieve	  such	  a	  proposition,	  then	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  withhold	  belief	  instead.28	  Weak	  luminosity	  applies	  not	  just	  to	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  disbelief,	  but	  also	  reasons	  for	  withholding:	  if	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  withhold	  belief,	  rather	  than	  believing	  or	  disbelieving	  a	  proposition,	  then	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  such	  a	  reason.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  other	  doxastic	  attitudes	  are	  strongly	  luminous,	  and	  not	  merely	  weakly	  luminous,	  given	  the	  restriction	  to	  propositions	  that	  one	  can	  entertain.	  This	  generates	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  cautious	  response.	  In	  the	  bad	  case,	  Macbeth	  can	  entertain	  the	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him,	  so	  there	  is	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  he	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt.	  Since	  the	  luminosity	  of	  reasons	  applies	  quite	  generally,	  he	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt	  such	  an	  attitude.	  According	  to	  the	  Knowledge	  View,	  the	  attitude	  that	  he	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  attitude	  he	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  word	  ‘can’	  is	  notoriously	  context-­‐sensitive.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  interpretation	  need	  only	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  rule	  out	  externalist	  contents	  when	  one	  does	  not	  satisfy	  the	  relevant	  externalist	  conditions.	  There	  need	  be	  no	  commitment	  to	  any	  stronger	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  abilities.	  See	  Streumer	  (this	  volume)	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue.	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So	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  combined	  with	  the	  weak	  luminosity	  of	  reasons	  yields	  the	  result	  that	  Macbeth	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  he	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  rather	  than	  the	  good	  case.	  But	  that	  is	  absurd.	  After	  all,	  as	  Williamson	  (2000:	  165)	  says,	  “Part	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  that	  one	  cannot	  know	  just	  how	  bad	  one’s	  case	  is.”	  I’ll	  consider	  two	  replies	  to	  this	  objection.	  The	  first	  reply	  exploits	  the	  distinction	  I	  have	  drawn	  in	  response	  to	  Williamson’s	  anti-­‐luminosity	  argument	  between	  epistemic	  and	  doxastic	  interpretations	  of	  being	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  subjects	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  in	  an	  epistemic	  position	  but	  not	  a	  doxastic	  position	  to	  know	  that	  they’re	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case,	  on	  this	  view,	  is	  that	  subjects	  are	  unable	  to	  exploit	  their	  epistemic	  position	  owing	  to	  their	  limited	  powers	  of	  discrimination.	  When	  we’re	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  are	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  but	  we	  cannot	  respond	  appropriately	  to	  these	  reasons	  because	  we	  cannot	  discriminate	  the	  bad	  case	  from	  the	  good	  case.	  This	  reply	  has	  at	  least	  two	  implausible	  consequences.	  The	  first	  consequence	  is	  that	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  or	  hallucination	  involves	  a	  rational	  defect	  in	  cognition.	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  preserve	  a	  distinction	  in	  respect	  of	  rationality	  between	  perceptual	  and	  cognitive	  malfunction.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  that	  one	  is	  cognitively	  irrational,	  but	  rather	  that	  being	  cognitively	  rational	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  result	  in	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  the	  external	  world	  given	  one’s	  perceptual	  deficiencies.	  The	  second	  bad	  consequence	  is	  that	  a	  fully	  rational	  thinker	  can	  always	  know	  when	  she	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  But	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  plausibly	  much	  worse	  than	  that:	  not	  even	  a	  fully	  rational	  thinker	  can	  know	  when	  she	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  Even	  a	  naïve	  realist	  like	  Martin	  (2004)	  concedes	  that	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  is	  indiscriminable	  from	  veridical	  perfection	  in	  an	  impersonal	  sense	  that	  abstracts	  away	  from	  the	  limited	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	  particular	  subjects.	  So	  the	  point	  holds	  as	  much	  for	  fully	  rational	  thinkers	  as	  it	  does	  for	  imperfectly	  rational	  thinkers	  like	  you	  and	  me.	  Any	  conception	  of	  rationality	  that	  denies	  this	  is	  hard	  to	  countenance.	  The	  second	  reply	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  always	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  On	  this	  view,	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  Macbeth	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt	  towards	  the	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  proposition	  is	  epistemically	  inert,	  and	  so	  it	  does	  not	  yield	  any	  counterexample	  to	  the	  weak	  luminosity	  of	  reasons.	  But	  this	  proposal	  has	  its	  own	  implausible	  consequences.	  First,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  precedent	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  propositions	  are	  epistemically	  inert.	  For	  any	  proposition	  that	  one	  can	  entertain,	  there	  is	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  adopt.	  Consider	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  number	  of	  books	  in	  my	  office	  is	  even.	  If	  you	  lack	  reason	  either	  to	  believe	  it	  or	  to	  disbelieve	  it,	  then	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  withhold.	  In	  general,	  withholding	  is	  reasonable	  by	  default	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  reasons	  for	  belief	  or	  disbelief.	  To	  deny	  this	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  seems	  ad	  hoc	  and	  unmotivated.	  Second,	  we	  cannot	  explain	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  purely	  negative	  notion	  of	  epistemic	  inertness.	  Consider	  the	  epistemic	  predicament	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  temporarily	  comatose.	  They	  have	  no	  first-­‐order	  reason	  to	  adopt	  doxastic	  attitudes	  and	  they	  have	  no	  second-­‐order	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  no	  first-­‐order	  reason.	  But	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  like	  that.	  Certainly,	  there	  are	  cognitive	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differences,	  since	  subjects	  are	  disposed	  to	  form	  beliefs	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination,	  but	  not	  in	  a	  comatose	  state.	  However,	  these	  cognitive	  differences	  fail	  to	  explain	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  differences.	  Compare	  my	  epistemic	  predicament	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  with	  that	  of	  my	  temporarily	  zombified	  twin.	  We	  form	  the	  very	  same	  beliefs,	  but	  the	  epistemic	  difference	  between	  us	  cannot	  be	  captured	  in	  purely	  negative	  terms.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  one	  lacks	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  In	  addition,	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  Finally,	  this	  reply	  repeats	  the	  mistake	  of	  diagnosing	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  cognitive	  irrationality.	  But	  now	  the	  guarantee	  of	  irrationality	  is	  not	  merely	  “medical”	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  was	  before.	  On	  the	  first	  reply,	  we	  are	  psychologically	  destined	  to	  be	  irrational	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  but	  our	  more	  fully	  rational	  selves	  are	  not.	  On	  the	  second	  reply,	  in	  contrast,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  avoid	  irrationality	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  Just	  by	  virtue	  of	  entertaining	  the	  proposition	  one	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  it	  –	  even	  if	  it	  is	  merely	  the	  attitude	  of	  not	  yet	  having	  made	  up	  one’s	  mind.	  But	  on	  this	  option,	  no	  such	  doxastic	  attitude	  is	  reasonable.	  So	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  an	  epistemic	  dilemma	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  whatever	  doxastic	  attitude	  one	  adopts,	  it	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  unreasonable.	  Whatever	  you	  do,	  you	  just	  can’t	  win!	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  very	  unattractive	  consequence	  of	  the	  view.	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  have	  considered	  two	  arguments	  against	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  These	  arguments	  are	  powerful,	  but	  they	  need	  to	  be	  weighed	  against	  the	  positive	  arguments	  for	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  In	  section	  4,	  I’ll	  consider	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  Knowledge	  View	  that	  appeals	  to	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons.	  	  
4. The	  ‘What?’	  Question	  What	  are	  the	  reasons	  that	  perception	  provides	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  I	  assume	  that	  if	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition,	  then	  there	  is	  something	  that	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  one	  has.29	  Our	  question	  is:	  what	  kind	  of	  thing	  is	  this	  reason?	  This	  question	  has	  an	  indirect	  bearing	  on	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  Content	  View	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  Although	  neither	  view	  entails	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  one	  can	  argue	  for	  the	  Knowledge	  View,	  and	  against	  the	  Content	  View,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  more	  general	  thesis	  that	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  the	  facts	  that	  one	  knows.	  Call	  this	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis:	  	  
• The	  R	  =	  K	  thesis:	  one	  has	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  The	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  is	  inspired	  by	  Williamson’s	  E	  =	  K	  thesis,	  which	  states	  that	  one	  has	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  part	  of	  one’s	  evidence	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.30	  They	  are	  equivalent	  given	  that	  all	  and	  only	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  evidence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  As	  explained	  in	  section	  1,	  I	  reject	  the	  Factoring	  Account,	  so	  I	  deny	  that	  subjective	  reasons	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  objective	  reasons.	  I	  also	  deny	  that	  the	  status	  of	  something	  as	  a	  subjective	  reason	  is	  independent	  of	  its	  being	  possessed.	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The	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  Content	  View.	  If	  we	  have	  the	  same	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case,	  then	  our	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  not	  coextensive	  with	  what	  we	  know,	  since	  we	  know	  more	  in	  the	  good	  case	  than	  we	  do	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  So	  if	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  Content	  View	  is	  false.	  The	  Knowledge	  View	  is	  not	  directly	  entailed	  by	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  alone,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  motivated	  by	  combining	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  with	  further	  assumptions.	  I’ll	  outline	  two	  strategies	  for	  closing	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  But	  first	  let	  me	  explain	  why	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  According	  to	  Williamson,	  one	  knows	  that	  p	  only	  if	  the	  epistemic	  probability	  that	  p	  is	  1.	  This	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis,	  since	  the	  epistemic	  probability	  of	  a	  proposition	  is	  defined	  as	  its	  probability	  given	  one’s	  total	  evidence	  –	  that	  is,	  one’s	  total	  set	  of	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  Now	  suppose	  that	  one’s	  knowledge	  that	  p	  makes	  it	  probable	  that	  q,	  but	  without	  entailing	  that	  q,	  so	  that	  the	  probability	  that	  q	  is	  high,	  but	  less	  than	  1.	  In	  that	  case,	  arguably,	  one	  has	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  q	  without	  knowing	  that	  q.	  The	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  does	  not	  rule	  this	  out.	  So	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  allows	  that	  you	  have	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  perception.	  In	  the	  good	  case,	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  because	  you	  know	  via	  perception	  that	  p.	  In	  the	  bad	  case,	  in	  contrast,	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  because	  you	  know	  that	  it	  seems	  that	  p,	  which	  makes	  it	  probable	  that	  p.	  In	  the	  good	  case,	  your	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  entail	  that	  p,	  whereas	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  your	  reasons	  make	  it	  probable	  that	  p	  without	  entailing	  that	  p.	  So	  you	  have	  reasons	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike,	  but	  you	  have	  more	  reasons,	  and	  better	  reasons,	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  The	  Knowledge	  View	  goes	  further	  than	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  insofar	  as	  it	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  one	  has	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  This	  is	  not	  entailed	  by	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  alone,	  but	  I’ll	  now	  consider	  two	  strategies	  for	  closing	  the	  gap.	  The	  first	  strategy	  rules	  out	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  has	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  without	  knowing	  that	  p.	  If	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  is	  true,	  then	  all	  reasons	  are	  grounded	  in	  knowledge,	  but	  we	  can	  distinguish	  further	  between	  the	  way	  in	  which	  inferential	  and	  noninferential	  reasons	  are	  grounded	  in	  knowledge.	  Let’s	  say	  that	  an	  inferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  is	  grounded	  in	  knowledge	  of	  other	  propositions,	  whereas	  a	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  is	  grounded	  in	  knowledge	  of	  that	  very	  proposition.	  This	  allows	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  has	  inferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  without	  knowing	  that	  p	  in	  virtue	  of	  knowing	  some	  other	  proposition	  that	  q.	  But	  any	  noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  is	  grounded	  wholly	  in	  knowledge	  that	  p.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  can	  have	  inferential	  reasons	  for	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  one	  cannot	  have	  noninferential	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  The	  second	  strategy	  rules	  out	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  has	  either	  inferential	  or	  
noninferential	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  without	  knowing	  that	  p.	  On	  this	  view,	  one	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  Williamson	  (2000:	  185)	  for	  the	  E	  =	  K	  thesis:	  “Knowledge,	  and	  only	  knowledge,	  constitutes	  evidence.”	  Compare	  Williamson	  (2007:	  120)	  for	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis:	  “that	  p	  is	  available	  to	  you	  as	  a	  reason	  if	  and	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p.”	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reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  only	  if	  the	  epistemic	  probability	  that	  p	  is	  1.	  Consider	  a	  lottery	  in	  which	  the	  epistemic	  probability	  that	  my	  ticket	  will	  lose	  is	  arbitrarily	  high,	  but	  less	  than	  1.	  In	  this	  case,	  Williamson	  claims	  that	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  my	  ticket	  will	  lose	  and,	  moreover,	  I	  don’t	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  it.	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  be	  highly	  confident	  that	  it	  will	  lose,	  but	  I	  don’t	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  this	  outright	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  disposed	  to	  assert	  that	  it	  will	  lose	  and	  to	  take	  this	  for	  granted	  as	  a	  premise	  in	  reasoning.	  But	  when	  I	  come	  to	  know	  that	  my	  ticket	  lost	  by	  watching	  the	  draw,	  then	  I	  can	  reasonably	  believe	  it.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  has	  neither	  inferential	  nor	  noninferential	  reasons	  for	  belief,	  although	  one	  may	  have	  reason	  for	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  belief.31	  What	  I’ve	  done	  so	  far	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  can	  be	  used	  in	  motivating	  the	  Knowledge	  View.	  There	  is	  plenty	  here	  to	  discuss,	  but	  given	  limited	  space,	  I	  want	  to	  press	  on	  now	  and	  examine	  arguments	  for	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis.	  Following	  Williamson	  (2000:	  193),	  the	  master	  argument	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  	   (1) All	  reasons	  are	  propositions.	  (2) All	  reasons	  are	  known	  facts	  (i.e.	  true	  propositions).	  (3) All	  known	  facts	  are	  reasons.	  (4) Therefore,	  all	  and	  only	  known	  facts	  are	  reasons.	  	  As	  Williamson	  (2000:	  194)	  acknowledges,	  each	  premise	  is	  contentious,	  but	  the	  argument	  as	  a	  whole	  provides	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  organizing	  our	  discussion.	  The	  Content	  View	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis,	  so	  it	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  what	  our	  reasons	  are.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  three	  options	  corresponding	  to	  the	  three	  premises	  in	  the	  master	  argument.	  The	  first	  option	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  
experiences.32	  The	  second	  option	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  known	  facts	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  
false.33	  The	  third	  option	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  facts	  that	  are	  least	  knowable,	  if	  not	  actually	  known,	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  all	  knowable	  facts	  are	  reasons	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  luminous	  facts.34	  If	  we	  have	  equal	  reasons	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case,	  then	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  that	  we	  have?	  What	  is	  Macbeth’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  perceptual	  hallucination?	  On	  the	  first	  account,	  his	  reason	  is	  a	  perceptual	  experience,	  which	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  On	  the	  second	  account,	  his	  reason	  is	  the	  false	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Williamson’s	  own	  view	  is	  hard	  to	  pin	  down.	  In	  his	  (2000),	  he	  allows	  that	  there	  can	  be	  justified	  false	  beliefs	  and	  Gettier	  cases	  in	  which	  justified	  true	  beliefs	  fall	  short	  of	  knowledge.	  In	  his	  (2007),	  he	  says	  that	  only	  knowledge	  is	  fully	  justified,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  whether	  he	  allows	  that	  an	  outright	  belief	  can	  be	  justified	  without	  being	  fully	  justified.	  32	  See	  Pollock	  and	  Cruz	  (1999),	  Conee	  and	  Feldman	  (2008),	  Turri	  (2009).	  33	  See	  Schroeder	  (2008,	  2011),	  Fantl	  and	  McGrath	  (2009),	  Comesana	  and	  McGrath	  (2014).	  34	  See	  Smithies	  (2012b).	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before	  him,	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  his	  perceptual	  experience.	  On	  the	  third	  account,	  his	  reason	  is	  the	  luminous	  fact	  that	  he	  has	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  I’ll	  consider	  each	  of	  these	  accounts	  in	  turn.	  	  
4.1. All	  Reasons	  are	  Propositions?	  The	  first	  option	  for	  proponents	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  premise	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  experiences.	  On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  is	  his	  visual	  experience,	  which	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  This	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  he	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike.	  Why	  suppose	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions?	  We	  often	  report	  reasons	  in	  propositional	  form.	  We	  might	  say,	  for	  example,	  that	  Jones’s	  reason	  for	  resting	  is	  that	  he	  feels	  tired.	  But	  we	  don’t	  always	  talk	  this	  way:	  it	  would	  be	  fine	  to	  say	  instead	  that	  Jones’s	  feeling	  tired	  is	  his	  reason	  for	  resting.	  So	  the	  appeal	  to	  ordinary	  language	  is	  indecisive	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  regard	  one	  of	  these	  ways	  of	  talking	  as	  a	  better	  guide	  to	  the	  ontology	  of	  reasons	  than	  the	  other.	  	  Williamson	  (2000:	  194-­‐7)	  argues	  that	  evidence	  must	  consist	  of	  propositions	  in	  order	  to	  play	  the	  theoretical	  roles	  that	  are	  central	  to	  our	  ordinary	  concept	  of	  evidence.	  For	  instance,	  evidence	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis	  by	  raising	  its	  probability	  or	  rule	  out	  a	  hypothesis	  by	  being	  inconsistent	  with	  it.	  But	  only	  propositions	  can	  play	  these	  roles.	  Therefore,	  evidence	  consists	  of	  propositions.	  We	  can	  give	  a	  parallel	  argument	  that	  reasons	  must	  be	  propositions	  in	  order	  to	  play	  the	  theoretical	  roles	  that	  are	  central	  to	  our	  ordinary	  concept	  of	  a	  reason.	  For	  instance,	  our	  reasons	  for	  belief	  make	  it	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  some	  propositions	  rather	  than	  others	  by	  entailing	  them,	  making	  them	  probable,	  or	  ruling	  them	  out	  by	  being	  inconsistent	  with	  them.	  But	  only	  propositions	  can	  play	  these	  roles.	  Therefore,	  reasons	  are	  propositions.	  In	  response,	  one	  might	  insist	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  reporting	  the	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  in	  propositional	  form	  and	  the	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  thereby	  reported.	  Thus,	  Earl	  Conee	  and	  Richard	  Feldman	  write:	  “The	  proposition	  reports	  the	  evidence	  or	  represents	  it.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  the	  evidence”	  (2011:	  321).	  With	  this	  distinction	  in	  hand,	  one	  might	  say	  that	  the	  logical	  and	  probabilistic	  roles	  that	  Williamson	  identifies	  are	  played	  not	  by	  reasons	  themselves,	  but	  rather	  by	  reports	  of	  the	  reasons	  in	  propositional	  form.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  theoretical	  role	  of	  reasons	  is	  rather	  different:	  reasons	  are	  what	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  beliefs	  are	  reasonable	  and	  thereby	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  reasonable	  beliefs.	  Compare	  John	  Pollock	  and	  Joseph	  Cruz,	  who	  write:	  “A	  state	  M	  of	  a	  person	  S	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  S	  to	  believe	  Q	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  logically	  possible	  for	  S	  to	  become	  justified	  in	  believing	  Q	  by	  believing	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  being	  in	  the	  state	  M”	  (1999:	  195).	  There	  is	  an	  important	  moral	  to	  be	  drawn	  here.	  Our	  ordinary	  concepts	  of	  reasons	  and	  evidence	  are	  associated	  with	  many	  different	  theoretical	  roles	  and	  there	  may	  be	  no	  one	  thing	  that	  can	  play	  all	  of	  these	  roles.35	  If	  so,	  then	  we	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  accept	  multiple	  conceptions	  of	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  corresponding	  to	  the	  various	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  Kelly	  (2014)	  for	  an	  overview	  that	  makes	  the	  same	  point.	  
	   24	  
different	  roles	  that	  are	  reflected	  in	  our	  ordinary	  concept.	  I’ll	  have	  more	  to	  say	  more	  about	  this	  possibility	  in	  section	  4.3	  below.	  	  
4.2. All	  Reasons	  are	  Known	  Facts?	  The	  second	  option	  for	  proponents	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  propositions,	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  known	  facts	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  some	  reasons	  are	  false.	  On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  is	  the	  false	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him,	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  his	  visual	  experience.	  This	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  he	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike.	  One	  might	  deny	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  known	  facts	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  not	  all	  reasons	  are	  believed.	  For	  instance,	  if	  my	  experience	  assertively	  represents	  that	  p,	  but	  I	  just	  happen	  to	  withhold	  belief	  that	  p,	  then	  it’s	  plausible	  that	  I’m	  failing	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  in	  my	  possession.	  If	  so,	  then	  having	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  does	  not	  require	  believing	  that	  p	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  perceptually	  representing	  that	  p.36	  Perhaps	  I	  must	  believe	  that	  p	  if	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  is	  to	  figure	  as	  a	  premise	  in	  reasoning.	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  I	  must	  believe	  that	  p	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  normative	  reason,	  or	  even	  a	  motivating	  reason,	  so	  long	  as	  reasoning	  is	  not	  required	  for	  basing	  one’s	  beliefs	  on	  reasons.	  If	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  then	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  know	  that	  p	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason.	  Do	  I	  need	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p?	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  R	  =	  K	  thesis	  can	  simply	  be	  revised	  as	  follows:	  	  
• The	  Revised	  R	  =	  K	  Thesis:	  one	  has	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p.	  	  A	  more	  serious	  objection	  is	  that	  one	  can	  have	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  without	  even	  being	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p	  because	  it	  is	  false	  that	  p.	  Why	  suppose	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  facts?	  Peter	  Unger	  (1975)	  gives	  a	  semantic	  argument	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  sentences	  like	  the	  following	  sound	  rather	  odd:	  “Fred’s	  reason	  for	  running	  was	  that	  the	  store	  was	  going	  to	  close	  in	  a	  few	  minutes,	  but	  in	  fact	  it	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  close.”	  Unger	  claims	  that	  such	  sentences	  sound	  odd	  because	  they	  are	  false.	  Therefore,	  he	  concludes	  that	  if	  someone’s	  reason	  for	  belief	  or	  action	  is	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  p.37	  Juan	  Comesana	  and	  Matthew	  McGrath	  (2014:	  71-­‐6)	  agree	  that	  these	  sentences	  sound	  odd,	  but	  they	  propose	  a	  pragmatic	  explanation	  in	  place	  of	  Unger’s	  semantic	  explanation.	  According	  to	  their	  proposal,	  saying	  that	  someone’s	  reason	  is	  that	  p	  presupposes	  that	  p	  without	  thereby	  entailing	  that	  p.	  They	  motivate	  this	  proposal	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  they	  note	  that	  the	  presupposition	  lapses	  in	  certain	  contexts.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  it’s	  common	  knowledge	  that	  Sally	  didn’t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Compare	  Schroeder	  (2011)	  for	  the	  proposal	  that	  one	  has	  a	  proposition	  as	  a	  reason	  just	  in	  case	  one	  has	  a	  presentational	  attitude	  towards	  that	  proposition:	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  this	  paper,	  one	  represents	  it	  as	  true	  with	  assertive	  force.	  37	  See	  Unger	  (1975:	  Ch.	  5).	  Compare	  Hyman	  (1999),	  Hornsby	  (2008),	  Hawthorne	  and	  Magidor	  (this	  volume)	  for	  related	  arguments.	  
	   25	  
get	  another	  offer,	  but	  merely	  thought	  she	  did,	  we	  can	  say,	  “Her	  reason	  for	  turning	  down	  the	  job	  was	  that	  she	  had	  another	  offer.”	  Second,	  in	  a	  context	  where	  this	  is	  not	  common	  knowledge,	  one	  can	  explicitly	  cancel	  the	  presupposition	  by	  saying,	  “Sally’s	  reason	  for	  turning	  down	  the	  job	  was	  that	  was	  that	  she	  had	  another	  offer;	  and	  that	  made	  perfect	  sense;	  however,	  her	  source	  was	  lying	  –	  she	  never	  had	  the	  other	  offer.”	  Williamson	  (2000:	  200)	  gives	  an	  argument	  from	  the	  function	  of	  evidence.	  One	  of	  the	  central	  functions	  of	  evidence	  is	  to	  confirm	  a	  hypothesis	  by	  inference	  to	  the	  best	  explanation	  when	  the	  hypothesis	  explains	  the	  evidence	  better	  than	  the	  alternatives.	  So	  evidence	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  hypotheses	  explain.	  But	  facts	  are	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  hypotheses	  explain.	  Therefore,	  evidence	  consists	  of	  facts.	  In	  response,	  however,	  one	  might	  claim	  that	  what	  hypotheses	  explain	  is	  not	  the	  evidence,	  but	  rather	  our	  possession	  of	  the	  evidence,	  where	  this	  is	  constituted	  by	  facts	  about	  our	  mental	  states,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  believe	  or	  perceptually	  represent	  the	  propositions	  that	  comprise	  our	  evidence.	  Williamson	  also	  gives	  an	  argument	  from	  cases.	  Suppose	  that	  many	  balls	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  bag	  and	  all	  of	  them	  are	  black.	  Williamson	  takes	  it	  as	  a	  datum	  that	  my	  evidence	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  some	  unobserved	  balls	  are	  red,	  but	  not	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  some	  observed	  balls	  are	  red.	  He	  explains	  the	  datum	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  evidence	  is	  knowledge:	  I	  know	  that	  all	  the	  observed	  balls	  are	  black	  but	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  all	  the	  unobserved	  balls	  are	  black.	  The	  datum	  can	  be	  disputed,	  but	  let	  us	  grant	  it	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument.	  We	  can	  explain	  it	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  one	  has	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  part	  of	  one’s	  evidence	  only	  if	  one	  has	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  In	  Williamson’s	  example,	  one	  has	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  all	  observed	  balls	  are	  black,	  but	  not	  that	  all	  unobserved	  balls	  are	  black.	  This	  proposal	  is	  distinct	  from	  Williamson’s	  because	  one	  can	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  even	  when	  it	  is	  false	  that	  p.	  A	  similar	  response	  applies	  to	  Williamson’s	  chain	  reaction	  argument:	  	  	   Our	  known	  evidence	  justifies	  belief	  in	  various	  true	  hypotheses;	  they	  would	  count	  as	  evidence	  too,	  so	  this	  larger	  evidence	  set	  would	  justify	  belief	  in	  still	  more	  true	  hypotheses,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  count	  as	  further	  evidence….	  The	  result	  would	  be	  very	  different	  from	  our	  present	  conception	  of	  evidence.	  (2000:	  201)	  	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  a	  non-­‐factive	  conception	  of	  evidence	  allows	  that	  one’s	  degree	  of	  justification	  gradually	  decreases	  as	  one	  continues	  along	  the	  chain	  of	  justification.	  But	  we	  can	  avoid	  the	  objection	  so	  long	  as	  we	  insist	  that	  one’s	  evidence	  must	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification.	  A	  proposition	  is	  excluded	  from	  one’s	  evidence	  as	  soon	  as	  one’s	  degree	  of	  justification	  to	  believe	  it	  drops	  below	  that	  level.	  But	  again,	  a	  proposition	  need	  not	  be	  true	  in	  order	  to	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification.	  Finally,	  Williamson	  argues	  that	  one’s	  evidence	  cannot	  rule	  out	  truths:	  	  	   If	  one’s	  evidence	  included	  falsehoods,	  it	  would	  rule	  out	  some	  truths,	  by	  being	  inconsistent	  with	  them.	  One’s	  evidence	  may	  make	  some	  truths	  improbable,	  but	  it	  should	  not	  exclude	  any	  outright.	  (2000:	  201)	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  But	  why	  should	  we	  accept	  that	  one’s	  evidence	  cannot	  rule	  out	  truths?	  Suppose	  my	  perceptual	  evidence	  rules	  out	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  am	  a	  handless	  brain	  in	  a	  vat	  by	  giving	  me	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  hands.	  Since	  I	  have	  the	  same	  evidence	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case,	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  my	  envatted	  duplicate.	  In	  that	  case,	  his	  perceptual	  evidence	  rules	  out	  a	  truth.	  Since	  evidence	  can	  be	  misleading,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  surprising.	  According	  to	  Williamson,	  misleading	  evidence	  can	  make	  truths	  improbable,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  truths.	  However,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  pressure	  to	  agree	  with	  him	  on	  this	  point.	  	  
4.3. All	  Known	  Facts	  are	  Reasons?	  The	  third	  option	  for	  proponents	  of	  the	  Content	  View	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  facts	  that	  are	  least	  knowable,	  if	  not	  actually	  known,	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  all	  knowable	  facts	  are	  reasons	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  all	  reasons	  are	  luminous	  facts.	  On	  tis	  view,	  Macbeth’s	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  is	  the	  luminous	  fact	  he	  has	  a	  visual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  This	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  he	  has	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike.	  Why	  suppose	  that	  all	  known	  facts	  are	  reasons?	  Williamson	  (2000:	  203-­‐7)	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  plausible	  restriction	  that	  is	  motivated	  by	  reflection	  on	  the	  function	  of	  reasons	  or	  evidence.	  But	  in	  section	  3.2,	  I	  argued	  that	  reasons	  must	  be	  luminous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  always	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  which	  reasons	  one	  has.	  The	  function	  of	  reasons	  is	  to	  make	  beliefs	  rational	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  facts	  about	  rationality	  will	  be	  luminous	  to	  the	  agent.	  But	  only	  luminous	  facts	  can	  play	  this	  role.	  Therefore,	  only	  luminous	  facts	  are	  reasons.	  Williamson	  also	  gives	  a	  positive	  argument	  that	  all	  known	  facts	  can	  function	  as	  reasons	  or	  evidence.38	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  you	  know	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  treat	  the	  proposition	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  belief	  and	  action	  –	  for	  instance,	  by	  using	  it	  as	  a	  premise	  in	  theoretical	  or	  practical	  reasoning.	  Thus,	  he	  writes:	  “If,	  when	  assessing	  an	  hypothesis,	  one	  knows	  something	  e	  which	  bears	  on	  its	  truth,	  should	  not	  e	  be	  part	  of	  one’s	  evidence?”	  (2000:	  203-­‐4)	  By	  these	  standards,	  the	  restriction	  to	  luminous	  facts	  is	  implausible.	  In	  most	  ordinary	  contexts,	  it	  sounds	  perfectly	  fine	  to	  say	  that	  someone’s	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  q	  is	  that	  p,	  where	  p	  is	  a	  non-­‐luminous	  fact	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  rather	  than	  a	  luminous	  fact	  about	  the	  subject’s	  mental	  states.	  We	  don’t	  always	  reason	  from	  premises	  about	  our	  own	  mental	  states;	  indeed,	  we	  reason	  more	  often	  from	  premises	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  And	  the	  same	  is	  true	  when	  citing	  evidence	  for	  scientific	  theories.	  So	  luminosity	  is,	  as	  Williamson	  (2000:	  173)	  notes,	  “a	  severe	  constraint	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  evidence.	  It	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  evidence	  consists	  of	  true	  propositions	  like	  those	  standardly	  offered	  as	  evidence	  for	  scientific	  theories.”	  In	  reply,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  two	  distinct	  conceptions	  of	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  that	  play	  two	  distinct	  functional	  roles.	  First,	  there’s	  a	  conception	  of	  reasons	  or	  evidence	  as	  facts	  that	  contribute	  towards	  making	  belief	  and	  action	  reasonable	  or	  rational	  or	  justified.	  And	  second,	  there’s	  a	  conception	  of	  reasons	  as	  propositions	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Compare	  Littlejohn	  (2012)	  and	  Byrne	  (2014)	  for	  related	  arguments.	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can	  serve	  as	  premises	  in	  good	  reasoning.	  But	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  reasons	  are	  distinct	  and	  conflating	  them	  threatens	  to	  distort	  our	  conception	  of	  rationality.	  James	  Pryor	  (2005)	  draws	  a	  related	  distinction	  between	  justification-­‐makers,	  which	  are	  facts	  that	  justify	  beliefs	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  them	  justified,	  and	  
justification-­‐showers,	  which	  are	  propositions	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  justifying	  beliefs	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  showing	  them	  to	  be	  justified.	  Given	  the	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  phrase	  ‘to	  justify’,	  it’s	  easy	  to	  confuse	  these	  two	  roles,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  them	  apart.	  Some	  philosophers	  use	  the	  term	  ‘reason’	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  former,	  while	  others	  use	  the	  term	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  latter.	  But	  we	  needn’t	  choose	  between	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  reasons.	  Instead,	  we	  can	  recognize	  them	  both.	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  justification-­‐making	  role	  is	  played	  by	  luminous	  facts	  about	  the	  subject’s	  mental	  states:	  these	  are	  the	  facts	  that	  make	  beliefs	  reasonable,	  rational,	  or	  justified.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  justification-­‐showing	  role	  is	  played	  by	  propositions	  that	  serve	  as	  premises	  in	  good	  reasoning:	  these	  propositions	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false	  and	  so	  they	  need	  not	  be	  luminous	  facts	  about	  the	  subject’s	  mental	  states.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality	  or	  justification	  is	  distorted	  when	  we	  try	  to	  find	  one	  thing	  and	  make	  it	  play	  both	  of	  these	  roles.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  think	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  reasons	  are	  connected.	  Showing	  your	  beliefs	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  most	  demanding	  standards	  requires	  citing	  the	  facts	  that	  ultimately	  make	  them	  justified.	  We	  typically	  operate	  with	  less	  demanding	  standards,	  but	  the	  only	  most	  demanding	  standards	  reveal	  the	  foundational	  structure	  of	  our	  reasons.	  What	  are	  the	  most	  basic	  premises	  that	  serve	  as	  the	  foundational	  starting	  points	  –	  epistemically,	  if	  not	  psychologically	  –	  for	  all	  good	  reasoning?	  I	  claim	  that	  these	  are	  luminous	  facts	  about	  one’s	  mental	  states.	  So	  the	  facts	  that	  make	  your	  beliefs	  reasonable	  are	  also	  the	  starting	  points	  for	  all	  good	  reasoning.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  rule	  out	  a	  more	  permissive	  conception	  of	  reasons	  that	  includes	  any	  proposition	  that	  can	  figure	  in	  good	  reasoning.	  But	  all	  reasons	  in	  this	  permissive	  sense	  are	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  luminous	  facts	  about	  experience.	  	  
5. Conclusion	  Let	  me	  end	  with	  a	  contrast	  between	  two	  rival	  accounts	  of	  what	  reasons	  are	  and	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  have	  and	  respond	  to	  reasons.	  On	  Williamson’s	  account,	  reasons	  are	  facts	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  Having	  those	  reasons	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  knowing	  those	  facts,	  while	  responding	  to	  those	  reasons	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  using	  this	  knowledge	  in	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  reasoning.	  This	  account	  is	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  proposal	  that	  perception	  provides	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  action.	  It	  leads	  to	  an	  over-­‐intellectualized	  account	  of	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception	  and	  it	  also	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  explain	  the	  cognitive	  rationality	  exhibited	  in	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  account	  that	  is	  much	  more	  congenial	  to	  the	  position	  of	  this	  chapter.	  On	  this	  alternative	  account,	  all	  reasons	  are	  facts,	  but	  not	  all	  facts	  are	  reasons.	  Reasons	  are	  facts	  about	  one’s	  mental	  states	  that	  are	  luminous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  always	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  they	  obtain	  when	  they	  do.	  There	  is	  no	  further	  requirement	  that	  one	  must	  actually	  know	  that	  these	  facts	  obtain	  in	  order	  to	  have	  and	  respond	  to	  one’s	  reasons.	  One	  has	  the	  fact	  that	  p	  as	  a	  reason	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  a	  luminous	  fact	  about	  one’s	  mental	  states.	  Meanwhile,	  one	  responds	  to	  this	  reason	  by	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believing	  or	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  causally	  sensitive	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  way	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  p.	  One	  need	  not	  actually	  believe	  that	  p	  or	  know	  that	  p	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  a	  luminous	  fact	  about	  one’s	  mental	  states.	  Ultimately,	  we	  need	  to	  resolve	  more	  general	  questions	  about	  the	  connection	  between	  reasons	  and	  rationality	  in	  order	  to	  settle	  more	  specific	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  reasons	  in	  perception.	  But	  thinking	  through	  the	  more	  specific	  questions	  can	  also	  help	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  more	  general	  questions.	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  made	  some	  progress	  towards	  that	  end	  in	  this	  chapter.39	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